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what is presented with the SCM has convergences with a social
cognition model we advanced (Semin & Cacioppo, in press
a; in press b), although the social cognition model we have
advanced is cast in a different mold, in particular with respect
to the distributed processes taking place between two or more
individuals.
However, the SCM relies on reception, namely, the construc-
tion of inner neural representations based on observed behavior.
Second, social cognition is restricted to a reproduction metaphor
(e.g., empathy, resonance, imitation, shared representations,
or mindreading). Finally, the model attempts to provide an
answer as to how intersubjectivity is achieved. However, the
model remains at a purely representational level, neglecting
the reciprocal nature and co-regulation of social behavior. The
three R’s (reception, reproduction, and representation) are con-
ceptual consequences of relying on an individual-centered para-
digm. There is a problem when social cognition, especially social
cognition that emphasizes imitation, is centered on the individ-
ual, however. Cognition evolved for the control of adaptive
action, and social cognition evolved for the control of adaptive
interaction in response to evolutionary demands for the organ-
ism’s survival and reproduction, which for humans always takes
place in a social context (Caporael 1997; Fiske 1992), and
involves the co-regulation of action. Imitation of a parent by an
infant is not a solitary event in the service of social cognition.
Instead, the infant’s imitative behavior elicits an imitative or nur-
turant response by the parent, which not only reinforces the
infant’s imitative response but also establishes a connection and
constitutes a co-regulation of action by the parent and infant.
Any depiction of the social cognition of imitation that ignores
the interaction and emergent information between individuals
is incomplete.
Thus, social cognition is not driven entirely by inner pro-
cesses and representations as the SCM suggests, but relies
on resources that are distributed across neural, bodily, and
environmental features (e.g., Agre 1997; Brooks 1999; Hutch-
ins 1995; Kirsch 1995) with the social and physical environ-
ment supporting social action and interaction (Smith &
Semin 2004). As this example illustrates, two or more individ-
uals are capable of (a) joint work to perform a feat that super-
sedes their individual capabilities, and (b) co-cogitation and co-
regulation to achieve this joint feat. Co-regulation encompasses
qualitatively different forms of co-action. The first is entrain-
ment and is exemplified by periodic co-action and occurs in
cycles. This can be illustrated with the example of rhythmic
clapping (e.g., Neda et al. 2000). The second form is non-per-
iodic co-action illustrated by mimicry or imitation (e.g., Char-
trand & Bargh 1999). The third case is exemplified when
people have to perform a complex task requiring interfacing
each other’s actions (as in open-heart surgery or playing
tennis). The third case entails the execution of complementary
actions, namely coordination, in the pursuit of accomplishing a
task (e.g., successful surgery, winning in tennis).
Entrainment, mimicry, and coordination can obviously all
occur simultaneously and to different degrees during social inter-
action. Take, for instance, a dialogue. Any dialogue features a
variety of instances of multimodal coordination, entrainment,
and mimicry. A dialogue can simultaneously manifest coordi-
nation as in the case of turn taking in a conversation (e.g.,
Sachs et al. 1974), or introducing a new topic, at a syntactic
level (e.g., syntactic priming; Bock 1986; 1989; Bock & Loebell
1990) or at an affective level (e.g., mood contagion; Neumann
& Strack 2000). Simultaneously, it is possible to see cyclically
occurring instances of affective facial expressions (e.g.,
Dimberg et al. 2000) and breathing movements (e.g., Furuyama
et al. 2005). Coordination and entrainment can converge when
joint behavior is goal driven (e.g., playing tennis versus choral
singing): It can be consciously accessible or escape conscious
access (two people moving a heavy object versus emotional
contagion), or a combination of both.
If the aim of the SCM is to fully understand the bases of emer-
gent social cognition and behavior, then it has to incorporate a
level of analysis of interacting dyads and beyond.
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Abstract: People cannot understand intentions behind observed actions
by direct simulation, because goal inference is highly context dependent.
Context dependency is a major source of computational intractability in
traditional information-processing models. An embodied embedded
view of cognition may be able to overcome this problem, but then the
problem needs recognition and explication within the context of the
new, layered cognitive architecture.
Susan Hurley proposes a layered cognitive architecture to model,
among other things, the human capacity for understanding
people’s actions. We applaud the effort because we believe cog-
nitive science can benefit from pursuing alternatives to the tra-
ditional cognitive-sandwich account, especially when it comes
to higher cognition (Haselager et al. 2003; van Rooij et al.
2002). We do see one potential problem with Hurley’s con-
ception of how layers 3 and 4 of the shared circuits model
(SCM) implement our ability to understand the goals that drive
people’s actions.
According to the SCM, people understand why people act by
“mirroring” the “means/ends structure of observed actions”
(sect. 4, para. 5 [layer 3]). From reading the target article, it is
less than clear what mechanism underlies the activity of mirror-
ing, but Hurley seems to have in mind a non-inferential mechan-
ism in which goals and actions are directly coupled. According to
Hurley, this is made possible by the fact that humans can reverse
the direction of the goal – action associations generated by their
own goal-directed actions. As a result, Hurley argues, “observing
movements generates motor signals in the observer that tend to
cause similar movements” (sect. 4, para. 5 [layer 3]). When the
motor outputs are inhibited to prevent overt copying, then the
system is able to engage in a form of “mirroring [that] simulates
in the observer the causes of observed action” (sect. 3.4, para. 5,
layer 4 of the SCM).
This conception of inferred goals and their relationship to
observed actions is not unproblematic. It seems implausible
that a simple one-to-one association between action and goal
can account for the intelligent ways in which humans infer
goals from observed actions. Research shows that the goals that
people infer depend in complex ways on the context in which
the actions are observed. For example, the action “pushing a
button with one’s head” can suggest the goal “that the button
be pushed” (e.g., when the person’s hands are occupied
holding a towel), or the goal “that the button be pushed with
the head” (when the hands are free to do the pushing as well).
Even infants are sensitive to such contextual factors, leading
them to push the button with their hands after seeing an adult
push it with her head while holding a towel in her hands, but
pushing the button with their heads when the adult’s hands
were free during the action (Gergely et al. 2002). These obser-
vations underscore the problematic nature of Hurley’s idea that
“observing movements generates motor signals in the observer
that tend to cause similar movements” (sect. 4, para. 5 [layer 3]).
From the perspective of motor plans, after all, pushing a
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button with the hand is very dissimilar from pushing it with the
head, yet infants will “copy” observed actions of adults in dissim-
ilar ways if appropriate given the context.
Two defenses of the SCM could be formulated at this point:
First, one could propose that the action-goal associations in the
SCM are not necessarily one to one. That is, multiple goals
could become associated with one and the same action
(e.g., picking up a pen could be associated with writing, pointing,
giving, etc.), and multiple actions could become associated with
one and the same goal (the goal to go to work can be associated
with walking, biking, driving, etc.). By “mirroring” one could then
retrieve multiple (hypothetical) goals for any given observed
action. Although it is conceivable that our brains build complexes
of action-goal associations, the question remains how it selects
which of the – potentially very many – possible goals is the
most plausible or likely goal in the current context. It is known
that context sensitivity of such abductive inferences can lead tra-
ditional information-processing models into the problem of com-
putational intractability, be they logicist (Bylander et al. 1991),
connectionist (Thagard 2000), or Bayesian models (Cooper
1990). It remains a challenge for the SCM, or other layered archi-
tectures, to incorporate abductive inference processes that can
circumvent this classical intractability problem (e.g., Cuijpers
et al. 2006).
Second, one could argue that from the perspective of the
observer, two actions do not constitute one and the same
observed action if the context of the actions differs. The argu-
ment could go as follows: the notion of “observed action” is to
be understood to include relevant parts of the context (in our
foregoing example: whether the hands are occupied or not);
then a unique mapping from action-context pairs to goals can
possibly be achieved by a mere “mirroring.” Note, however,
that such a proposal serves only to move the problem from
understanding the role of context in goal inference to the
problem of understanding how people decide which aspects of
the context are relevant parts of the current action. This is one
of the many disguises in which the infamous frame-problem
shows itself (Ford & Pylyshyn 1996; Haselager 1997; Pylyshyn
1987): Figuring out the proper demarcation of what constitutes
an “action” is computationally no less challenging than finding
the most likely goal in a set of possible goals.
By claiming that goal understanding involves in part an infer-
ential process, we do not mean to suggest that the process is
necessarily conscious, controlled, or reasoned in any way.
The mechanism can be highly automatic, unconscious, and
even build on associative principles. Its implementation may
involve the so-called mirror neuron system (Newman-Norlund
et al. 2007), but it may also draw upon different neural
systems, depending on the nature or complexity of the inferential
task (e.g., de Lange et al., submitted). We see it as a challenge for
future research to reconcile functional, computational, and
neural explanations of goal inference in a way that explains how
people can effectively and efficiently make plausible inferences
about other people’s goals and intentions in contexts of real-
world complexity. So far, traditional information-processing
models have failed in this pursuit, due to the apparently insur-
mountable problem of computational intractability. This is not
the place for a full sketch of our views, but we would like to
suggest that an embodied embedded view of cognition may
prove useful in addressing this problem. First of all, Hurley’s
layered (rather than “sandwiched”) view of the cognitive archi-
tecture may invite an alternative, nontraditional conception of
the inferential task posed to the brain (e.g., van Dijk et al., in
press). Secondly, properties of world and body can serve as cog-
nitive resources that may reduce the computational complexity of
the inferential task (van Rooij & Wareham, in press).
In sum, Hurley’s model is to be welcomed as a nontraditional
model of action understanding, but the mechanisms behind
layers 3 and 4 need clarification in view of the computational pro-
blems they are supposed to be solving. Embodiment and
embeddedness may help to provide clues for such clarification,
although currently this is more a way to formulate the challenge
than to answer it.
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Abstract: Three related issues are addressed. First, Hurley treats
emulation and imitation as a straightforward dichotomy with emulation
emerging first. Recent conceptual analyses and “ghost” chimpanzee
experiments challenge this. Second, other recent chimpanzee experiments
reveal high-fidelity social transmission, questioning whether copying
fidelity is the brake on cumulative culture. Finally, other cognitive
processes such as pretence need to be integrated.
Susan Hurley’s target article is an extraordinary achievement.
I cannot judge her contribution from the perspective of philoso-
phers, but she has done those of us working on the empirical
sciences side of the topics she reviews a great service by pulling
together potentially mutually relevant discoveries and developing
specific models of how they might form evolutionary or develop-
mental cascades. Having said this, my three sets of comments are
rather along the lines of: “here are yet more empirical findings
with which any modelling needs to be consistent.”
1. Imitation and emulation. Hurley presents imitation versus
emulation as a clear and straightforward dichotomy, with
imitation emerging at a higher level in the shared circuits
model (SCM). However, recent analyses in animal social
learning studies have dissected emulation into several different
categories, some of which overlap with imitation under the
general heading of “copying” (Whiten 2006). For example,
when a chimpanzee matches whichever of two forms of tool
use they see (Whiten et al. 2005a), some level of copying is
implicated, and even if the matching to the model is in how
the tool moves rather than the bodily actions involved, it is not
so clear why this should not be regarded as a form of imitation
(copying what the model does with their tool) rather than
emulation (copying only the model’s effects in the world – how
the tool operates). Turning to the empirical evidence, I would
argue there is far less direct evidence for emulation in
nonhuman animals than Hurley implies. Rather, emulation is
often ascribed to an animal as a default explanation when the
animal evidences social learning that goes beyond mere
stimulus enhancement, but shows little or no imitative fidelity.
Positive evidence for emulation is harder to come by. If one
sees emulation as learning specifically about the environmental
results of actions alone, then one experimental design recently
developed becomes particularly significant in this regard. This
is the “ghost” experiment in which we discover what observers
learn from seeing only an action’s environmental effects, which
is what an emulation hypothesis suggests they are learning
about. In a recent experiment of this kind we obtained the
striking result that chimpanzees failed to learn the complex tool
technique involved (Hopper et al. 2007), despite having
demonstrated earlier that they would copy the particular one of
two such techniques they see performed by a chimpanzee
(Whiten et al. 2005a). In short, for learning the most complex
technologies they can handle, chimpanzees seem to need to see
another chimpanzee perform the act. This finding and the
handful of other similar “ghost” studies completed with
children and nonhuman species (for a review, see Hopper
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